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The paper presents conditions \'1hich guarantee that the control 
strategies adopted by N players constitute an efficient solution, an 
equj,11brium, or a core solution.. The system dynamics are described 
by an Ito equation, and all players have perfect information. When 
the set of instantaneous joint costs and velocity vectors is convex 
the conditions are necessary. 
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§l. INTRODUCTION 
N players are simultaneously controlling the evolution of a system 
described by the Ito equation 
1 N dZt = f(t,z,ut, ••• ,ut ) dt + dBt' t E [0,1] (l~ 
W:lere (Zt) is the state process, i (B\., is Bro'~mian motion and (ut ) is the 
control of the ith ~layer. Player i chOQses this control so as to mini-
mize the cost 
1 iii 
= E[f c (t,z,ut)dt + Y (z)J, 
o 
(2) 
h () ( 1. N) were U = 1.lt = ut ., ••• , ut • 
Different solution cl')ncepts of the resulting game are studied. 
1* N* Sufficient conditions are given \.;hich guarantee that u* = (ut, ••• ,ut ) 
is a (Nash) equilibrium, a (Pareto) efficient solution, or a member of 
the core. tfuen the set of admissible cost-drift vectors (cl, ••• ,cN,f) 
possesses a certain convexity property, these sufficient conditions become 
necessary. 
'" 
The next: sec·tion gives a precise model of the game. The convexity 
property is stated, and its main irnplications are dra\'/n out in section 3. 
The main results are given in section 4. i A priori conditions on the c 
and f which imply the convexity property are ex~uined in section 5 • 
" 
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§2i. 'I'HE HODEL 
2.1 Admissible Controls 
~le sample paths of the state proce5s (Zt) are evidently continuous, 
hence n>ewhers of the Banach space C of all continuous functions W: [O,l]-~Rn .• 
Let tt be the evaluation functional on C, that is, ~t(W)=w(t). Let Ft be the 
a-field of subsets of C generated by {l;s \0< S ~tl. Let F==f 1. 
For each i U. is a compact metric space, the set of actions 
,-
.. available to i. A function u
i
: [0,1] x ~~u. is an (adwissible) control for iif 
l. 
(i) i . u l.S jointly measurable, 
(ii) i fI,i (t,. ) is f t - measurable for all t. ut = 
U. denotes the set of controls for i. 
l. 
Denote U = ulx ••• xUN with elements u = (ul"'.'~) and U = ulx ••• xu
N 
with elements 
1 N 
U == (U , ••• ,U ,. For ue:U, ve:u and i E {l~ ••• ,N} denote 
(u ,v., = (ul '··· ,u. l'v. ,u. 1"·· 'UN'· ":' l. l.- l. l.+ 
l. 
l-!ore generally, for S C h, ... ,N} 
denote (u_,vS) to be the N-tuple 
.5 
obtained from u upo~ replacing ~i by Vi 
for each iES. 
. i i 5 S 
In exactly the same way one def1nes (U ,V ) and (u ,V ) when 
U and V are in U. 
2.2 Dynamics 
n . 
The function f: lO,l] x C x U+R in (1) satisfies the follo~'1in9 conditions: 
(i) f is jointly measurable, 
(ii) f(t,· ,u) is f t- measurable for all t,u and f(t,w,·) is con-
tinuous for all t,w, 
(iii) There is a constant k such that If(t,w,u) l~k(:J.+llwll) 
for all t,w,u. 
Let P denote \'liener measure on ec, f). Let (Zt) be the family of eval-
uation functionals on C so that (zeF t'P) is a n-dimenr:;i.onal, standard, 
" 
, ' 
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Bro\'lnj.an motion. For U£.U define the drift (¢~,Ft' P) by 
U $t = f(t,z, u(t,z» 
and the density (p~,Ft' P) by 
t t 
pU = U 1/2 II ¢u12 ds] exp [/ <I> dz -t o s s o s 
u U Denote P =P1 " The ne;~t result is \·/ell-kno\.;n [1,2 ]. 
Theorem 1 
where' 
Ll' ,u 
P (F) = I P (z)P(dz) , FEF 
. F u u 
Furthermore, the process (wt,Ft,p ) defined by 
t 
w
U 
= z - I <flU ds 
. t t 0 s 
is a Brm'lnian motion. 
This theorem justifies the follo·.oling definitior;." T'ne solution of (1) 
U 
corresponding to UEU is the process (Zt,FtiP ). 
2.3 solutions of the Game 
Conditions analogous to those imposed on f are also imposed on the 
f . i . unctl.ons c lon (2) • h f . i F' abl d i t b T e unct~ons Y : c+R are - measur e an negra Ie 
u i i 
'olith respect to P for all Lt. In addition, the c and yare non-negative. 
The cost to player i of udt is defined to be 
~ (Lli , i 
J .. (u) = E [/ c (t,· ;ut)dt + y (-)] t 
o . 
where EU denotes e>:pectation ''lith respect to pU. 
Recall the following definitio~s" 1* N* u* = (u , ••• u ) is 
a) all equilibrium if there is no i and no u such that 
b) efficient if there is no (L such that 
Ji (LL) < Ji (U.) for all i 
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c) in the core if there is no S and no U. such that 
i *5 S i * J (u. ,u.) < J (u. ) for all i£s 
To avoid confusion it should b~ pointed out that the d(~finitions b) 
and c) are not the standard ones. U3u~11y, Lt* is said to be efficient if 
there is no u. such that .1i Cu.) -!'. Ji (t~*) for all i ''lith the strict inequality 
holding for at least one i. If one adopts this definition, then the ob-
servation at the beginning of section 4.3 belo' .... needs to be modified and 
so do the subsequent results; these modifications are slight but clumsy, 
and the definition given here avoids the cl~~siness. In any case the differ-
ence is slight. The core is usually defined only for games where compari-
son of inter-personal utilities is permitted and where side 'payments are 
allo\'led. For games ,·,here such comparison is not pel.-mitted, as :i.s the nor-
'mal posture in mathematical economics, one is naturally led to the defini-
tion given here. 
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§3. TilE CONVEXITY PROPERTY 
1 N' Let g(t,z,u) = (c (t,z,u) , ••• ,c (t,z,u), f{t,z,u». 9 is an (N+n)-
dimensional vector. 
The game is said to have the conv~xity propert~ if £or all t,z 
{g(t,z,u) lur:;u} , 
is a convex set. It is said to have the Etrong convexity ~roperty if 
for all t,z,u and for all S 
. {g(t,z, (u_,v
s
') Ive:u} 
S 
is a convex set. 
In [1] and [2] it is sho',in that the convexity property implies that 
the set of densities obtained by using all possible· admissible controls 
is convex. The tW(l lemmas belm .. f0110\.; readily from these results. 
LetMIa 1 Suppose the game has the convexity property. Then 
is a convex subset of ~. 
Lemma 2 Suppose the game has the strong convexity property. Let u.cU 
and.S C h, ... ,N}. Then 
N is a convex subset of R • 
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§4. nIE ~u\IN RESULTS 
4.1 A Result from Control Theory 
Suppose N=l so that the game is simply an optimal control problem. 
Dropping superscripts and subscripts, the control problem is to find 
a~£U so as to nunimize 
1 
J(u) = Ea [fc(t,· ,ut)dt + y(o'») 
o 
A minimizing control is said to be optima 1. 
The result beloi'l has been proved in (3) in a slightly more restrictive 
form than nece&sary. 
Theorem 2 a· is an optimal control if and only if there exist a constant 
J*, and processes (AVt ), (\1\) with values in R,R
n 
respectively such that 
\ . 1 I 
(i) J* + ~ AVt dt + ~ VVtdZt = Y a.s. 
(ii) A\ +l-lin {VVtf(t,z,u) + c(t,z,u)} = 0, 
uEU 
and the minimu.'U is achieved at a*(t,z) for alm'Jst all t,z. FUl:"thel"more, 
J*=J (a*) is the Il'.inimum cost; in fact, 
t t U 1 , i 
J* + / flV ds + / VV dz = Nin E ·{/eJ.(s,z,u )ds + Y 1ft} 
o s 0 s s U.EU t s 
4.2 Conditions for Equilibrium 
1 •.. (*1 *N). 'l'b" f I The contro s a = u , .•. ,a constJ.tute an equJ. ~ rJ.mn 1. and on y 
i ' .i , " i (.i i). th t Ui f for each 1. a ~nJ.~zes J a ,a over ese' • Theorem 2, there-
fore, immediately yields the next result. 
'l'heorem 3 i N) . 'l'b" f d 1 'f f h ' a* = (a* ~ ••• ,tl* ~s an equJ. l.. rl.\lffi l. an on y l. or eae 1. 
i i (VV!) such that there exis t a constant J* , and processes (AV t ), 1 1 
VVi i (1) J* + / AVi dt + / dz = y a.s. 
0 t 0 t t 
I 
I 
I 
! 
i 
I 
I 
~ 
! 
I 
! 
f 
I 
! 
i ;! 
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(ii) iii i Bin {"IV f(t,z, (u* (t,z), u.» -I- c (t,z, (u* (t,z) ,u.»} - 0 
t 1. 1. U.£U. 
1. 1. 
and the mini.mum is achieved at u",i(t,z) 
4.3 Conditions for Efficiency 
a.s. 
1 N I Consider the set J = {J(U) == (J (u), ••• ,J Cu.)} u.e:U}, the set of attain-
able cost vectors. Suppose ther.e axis ts a non-negative vector A= 0'1 ' ..• , AN) to 
and a* such i:.hat 
AJ(u*) 2 AJ for all Je:J ( 3) 
It is then immediate that u.* is an efficient solution. It is also \-1e1l-
known that (3) is a necessary condition in the event that] is a convex 
set. This observation, in conjunction \<lith Thedrem 2 and Lemma 1, imply 
t.he lle}:t result. 
Theorem 4 a) u* is an efficient solution if there exist A>O, A~O, and 
for each i a constant J*i, and processes (AV~), (VV~) such that 
(i) 1: >... [J*i 
1 IW! dt 1 i + J + J VVi dzt ] == r. ) .. y a.s. 1 0 o t 1. 
1: A. AVi + Hin i: Ai {VV~ f(t,z,u) + ciCt,z,u)} == 0, 1. t 
ue:u 
(ii) 
and the mininlUm is achieved at u*(t,z) a.s. 
b) If the gan~ has the co~vexity property, then the conditions 
above are necessa~~ for efficiency. 
From a game-theoretic viewpoint an efficient solution is of interest 
only insofar as it is also an equilibrium. The combination of the results 
above gives the first intriguing result. Its proof is given in the Appendix. 
Theorem 5 a) u* is an efficient equil:i.bt-ium if the.re exist for each i a 
constant J",i, and proc,~::<.S~5 (,J\V~), (VV~) such that 
~ . 
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(i) 
. I. I. i 
J*1 + f A~ dt + fV~ dZt = y a.s. o 0 t 
(ii) , AVt
i 
+ run {\1Vi f(t,z,(u*i(t,z) ,u.» + ci(t,z,Cu*i(t,z) ,u.»} = 0, 
U.EU. t 1 l. 
1. 1. 
and the' minimum is achieved at u*i(t,z) a.s., 
(iii) there exist A>O, A~O such that 
1: ).i {Vv! f(t,z,Lt* (t, z» + ci (t,z,u* (t,z» }=. Bin r \ {W! f(t,z ,u) +ci (t,z,u) }a.s. 
uEU 
b) If the game has the convexity prQperty, then the conditions 
above are also necessary. 
Remark Define the Hamiltonian Hi(t,z,u) ==> V'{ f(t,z,u) + ci(t,z,u). Condition (ii) 
above says that i.th Hall"iltonian Il1USt be minimized along the ith "coordillate" ~. 
U. • Condition (iii) says that in order that the "private" miniIJ'lization (im-
.l. 
plied in the equilibrium concept) also be "socially" efficient this private 
minimization should lead to the "global" minirniz3.tion of the social cost 
obtained as a weighted co~ination of the private costs. ~intriquinq par~ 
of the result is that these "Ieights, the ).. , are constant, that is, they do 
1. 
not depend on time t or L~e random state z. 
4.4 Conditions for the Core 
The result for the core f0110\·;s in the Sarna way as Theorem 5. 
Theorem 6 a) u* is in the core if there exist for each i a consta."'tt. J*i, 
and. processes (Av!>, (V{> such that 
1 1 ( ~> J*i f ~Vi f <:7,i d i 
... + II t dt + \. t Zt = Y a.s. 
o 0 
(ii) t1in {W t
i f(t,z,(u·i(t,z) ,u.) + ciCt,z,(u.i(t,z) ,u.»} = 0, 
l. l. 
u.EU. 
l. 1 
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and the minimum is achieved at u*iCt,Z) a.s. 
(iii) for each S there exist constants ~~>o, iES, not all zero, 
~-
such that 
t~~{VVi f('t,z,u*Ct,z»+ciCt,z,u*Ct,z»}:.: Hin t~~ {\TV! f(t,Z,(u*SCt,z),u
s
) 
iES 1 t uEU isS ~ 
+ ci(t,z,(u*S(t,z) ,us)} a.s. 
b) If the ga~e has the strong c~nvexity prope~ty, then the 
conditions above are also necessar.f. 
Remark It IT'.ay appear reasonable, at first sight, to conjecture that the 
weights, A~, should not depend upon s. Ho\.,ever, upon further reflection, 
.1. 
the reader should become convinced that this is unlikely. Thus the \veights 
associated \"lith different players \'lill va,.ry ,-lith the coalition S in which 
they are being considered as me~ers. 
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§ 5. PJ\NOONIZED STRA'£EGIES 
The convex.i ty property is evidently quite res tricti ve • HCMever, 
if one permits randomized controls, then convexity is guaranteed. To see 
this, define H. as the set of all probability measures on U.. U. can then 
~ ~ ~ 
be regarded as a subset of H. and the function f can be extended to the 
1. 
domain [0,1) XCXL'\X'. , •• xr-~ by setting 
i The cost functions c can be extended analogously. The spaces H. can 
~ 
be made compact and roetrizable in a standard manner and f(t,z,·) rCl'itains 
continuous on N=N1X, ••• X t~N. The controls for i are nm'1 randomized controls 
. . i [ ] that ~s functl.ons m,: , 0,1 x The previous results continue to hold 
for th is "extended" game. But notice from (4) that this extended game enjoys 
the convexity prope'rty and if joint randomization is allo,'ied it also enjoys 
the strong convexity property. 
.': 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 5 
Part a of the theorem f0110\1s iml-nedia te ly from theorem 3 and Part a 
of theorem 4. Hence it only r~mains to prove Part b •. 
By theorem 3 there exist for each i J*i, and processes (AV~), (W!> :;ouch that 
1 i 1. 
*i ~ i 
J + r A V tdt + f. VV t dz t = Y a. s • 
o 0 
A,1.f
t
· + l1in {VV
t
i f(t,z, (u*i(t,z) ,u.» + ci(t,z, (u.j.(t~Z) ,u.»} ;:: 0 
l. '. l. 
u.E:U. l. 1. 
and the roinim~~ is achieved at u~(t,z). On the other hand, by Part b of l. 
h Ath . '>0 \JO d f ' l.' v:*i, d ,,,y.i) t eorem ~ ere eXl.st A_ ' AT an or eacn ., an processes ~~dt ' 
1·. 1 
r A. [K*i+ 1 AW
t
1. dt + 1 Vwi dz
t
] = 
1. 0 0 t 
i r ) .. y 
1. 
Bin L \ {V~-l~ f(t,z,u) + ci(t,z,u)} = 0 
uE:U 
and the minimum is achieved at u*(t,z) a.s. 
Comparison of these t,~·o sets of conditions reveals that it is enough 
to show that ,,,henever (Al) and (A2) are bot..'-1 satisfied, then (A2) is also 
satisfied by choosing .. --.-... ~ .... 
K. i = J*i, AVli A~' and ;:: t 'Y.,i '~t = V· i Vt 
No .. ', by the last part of theorem 2, 
j"i t AVi t V{ + 1 ds + 1 dz 
0 t 0 s 
(AI) 
(A2) 
I • 
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1 
-.tin EIt{f i ( ( A-i = I.' C S,Z, Ll' , 
u£U t 5 5 
1 
= EU*{f i il } c (5'Z5,tl.~) + Y . Ft t 
and similarly, 
. t. t. 
I A [K *l. + ! ~ wl. ds + f "Vr.l dcr 1 i 0 J~ 5 0 5 ~~5 
Hence, 
. t. t. . t. t, 
. I A. [J*;l. + ! A ~ d5 + ! VVl. dz ] = I A. [K*l. + f AWl. ds + ! V~-:l. dz ] 
;t. 0 S 0 5 S 1 0 S 0 S 5 
Setting t:=O, gives I A.J*i 
1 
t . i 
f (I A. V1 - I A .l'7 ) ds 
o 1 S 1 S 
- I A.:K*i and 50 
1 
But, under the measure P (Zt) is a Bro','mian motion so that the term on the 
right is a continuous martingale whereas the term on the left is a process 
with integrable variation. It fo110"';5 that both tern's must vanish so that 
I,\.; = ]. S I A.W
i 
and I A. vI 
15 1 S 
= r A. Vr;l and the result follot·ls. ;l. 5 
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§ 6. ,CONCLUSIO;:.lS 
These remarks are mainly suggestions for further researC!1. 
It is knO'Nn that for deterministic differential games the condition 
that the weights A. are constant is sufficient but no'\:: necessary even \.,.hen 
1. 
the game has the convexity property. The results presented here therefore 
convey surprise. HOltleVer, it is not evident that these results should bg 
regarded as curiosities or as significant. To deciee this it is necessary 
to clarify the precise role played by the Brm'1nian motion in (1). Such 
clarification should also aid ,in restoring a measure of uni ty to the currently 
disparate traditions in the literature on deterministic and stochastic differ-
ential games. In the cases of control problems al'ld bolO-player Zel.,,:-Stm games 
this has been achieved by the important \'lOrk of Fleming [4,5] and subsequent 
work of Danskin [6] and Friedman [7], but it is not clear that these 
directions will prove useful for the many-player games. 
This paper is not add:r..·essed to the iIl'flortant qu.estion of existence of 
solutions. For efficient controls, this question is iwmediatcly settled 
by known results on existence of optimal controls. 1~ recent study [8] 
has nicely resolved the problem of existence of saddle points and value 
for tw~-playerr zero-sum, stclchustic differential games. It seems likely 
that the methods used in that study co~hined with the usual fixed-point 
arg\ments will help in proving existence of equilibrium solutions and the 
core. 
Finally, the condition of complete information is a serious !. erior1 
restriction on the family of games considered in this paper. It is likely 
that results similar to those obtained here hold ,.,hen all players have 
the ~ information even if it is incomplete [9). The game is enormously I 
i 
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more complicated when different players have different information. In 
the context of sta-tic games many impC;lrtant lnsights are provid~d by the 
results reported in [10,111. 
Note: Reference [9) contains several incorrect statoments. 
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